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CASE COMMENT

THE FACTUAL REALITY OF KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS
Eric Dean Hageman*
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just
compensation.”1 On its face, this language provides private actors
monetary relief for government seizures of their property. For twentyseven years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause more
expansively, such that it protects property owners seeking land-use
permits.2 In particular, the Court has interpreted the clause to limit the
type3 and amount4 of property a government can demand in exchange for a
land-use permit. This protection is considered an application of the
5
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the field of regulatory takings. The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that a government may not
deny a private actor a public benefit in order to incentivize the
6
relinquishment of a constitutional right. Thus, as a general matter, it acts
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; Bachelor of
Architecture, University of Notre Dame, 2013. I thank Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett for
her patient instruction in property and land-use law, as well as for her input in this
Comment’s drafting. I also thank my co-editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
revisions. All errors are my own.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court incorporated this provision against
state and local governments. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 255–57 (1897).
2 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
3 See id.
4 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
5 See Molly Cohen & Rachel Proctor May, Comment, Revolutionary or Routine?
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 249
(2014).
6 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The denial of a
public benefit may not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive
enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly.”); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental
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to vindicate private actors’ constitutional rights by preventing governments
7
from coercing them to give up those rights. In vindicating the Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation, the Supreme Court protects private
actors more than the doctrine would otherwise. In particular, the Court
requires that a condition to a land-use permit must bear an “essential
8
nexus” to “the end advanced as the justification for” the condition and be
9
“rough[ly] proportional[]” to the “impact of the proposed development.”
10
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Court
extended the unconstitutional conditions doctrine’s protections even further
in two respects. First, the Court held that a government’s conditions for
land-use permits are subject to Nollan’s and Dolan’s nexus and
11
proportionality tests “even when the government denies the permit.”
Second, the Court subjected such conditions to the same tests when a
12
government demands money instead of real property rights. The Court
remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court for the resolution of an
issue of state statutory law.13
14
Writing for four Members of the Court, Justice Kagan dissented.
She objected to the second half of the Court’s holding, asserting that the
extension of Nollan and Dolan to monetary conditions “r[an] roughshod
over” the Court’s precedents and “threaten[ed] to subject a vast array of
15
land-use regulations . . . to heightened constitutional scrutiny.” She also
asserted that the government actor, St. Johns River Water Management
District (the District), “never demanded anything . . . in exchange for a
16
permit” and that as such, the Nollan/Dolan tests should not apply.
Finally, she observed that “no taking occurred in this case because
[petitioner] Koontz never acceded to a demand . . . and so no property
benefit . . . [the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests . . . .”).
7 See Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
699 F.3d 962, 986 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Understood at its most basic level, the [unconstitutional
conditions] doctrine aims to prevent the government from achieving indirectly what the
Constitution prevents it from achieving directly.”).
8 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
9 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
10 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
11 Id. at 2603 (emphasis added).
12 Id.
13 Id. A Florida statute provided for damages to parties subjected to “an unreasonable
exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.” Id. at
2593 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014)). The Court remanded the case despite the
fact that no taking occurred (since the government denied the plaintiff’s permit). Id.
14 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2603–04.
16 Id. at 2604.
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changed hands.” From that fact, she concluded that “Koontz therefore
[could not] claim just compensation under the Fifth Amendment” and that
18
the Court should have dismissed the case for that reason.
The Court’s opinion in Koontz has elicited many negative reactions in
19
academia, most of which focus on the expansion of Nollan and Dolan to
20
monetary exactions. Criticisms run the gamut: some scholars argue that
the Court was wrong to ignore the environmental impact of land
21
developments,
while others suggest the Court gave the same
22
consideration too much credence. These criticisms are likely premature
and necessarily speculative, since the Court decided the case less than two
years ago.
Scholars have scrutinized this case’s factual and procedural history
less closely, and those elements may justify the Court’s holding. Two
often-overlooked facts are particularly important. First, the government’s
demand was unusually exploitative—the District offered no sufficient
justification for the exaction, and it was large in comparison to the
Id.
Id. Koontz “brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of action,” id. at 2597
(majority opinion), and as such, the Court remanded the case to Florida’s courts to decide
whether his cause of action could survive despite the fact that no actual taking occurred. Id.
at 2597, 2603.
19 See, e.g., Cohen & Proctor, supra note 5, at 253 (noting that the Koontz Court
failed to realize the breadth of the decision’s impact); Richard A. Epstein, Modern
Environmentalists Overreach: A Plea for Understanding Background Common Law
Principles, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 36–37 (2014) (“[Koontz] invent[ed] a very large
notion of ‘harm,’ and then announc[ed] that some duty of environmental mitigation shall be
imposed upon all landowners who have the temerity to want to build on their own land
without creating a nuisance to anybody. The performance on every side of this particular
argument was lamentably incompetent in terms of the way in which it was organized.”
(footnote omitted)); Israel Piedra, Comment, Confusing Regulatory Takings with Regulatory
Exactions: The Supreme Court Gets Lost in the Swamp of Koontz, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 555, 555 (2014) (“[I]t was unwise for the Court to apply [Nollan’s and Dolan’s
restrictions] to monetary exactions.”); Kristin N. Ward, Comment, The Post-Koontz
Landscape: Koontz’s Shortcomings and How to Move Forward, 64 EMORY L.J. 129, 129
(2014) (noting that the Court was “unsympathetic to environmental protection at the local
level” and “suspicious of local government’s ability to make reasoned land-use decisions
without extorting unfair value from property owners”).
20 See, e.g., Cohen & Proctor, supra note 5, at 257 (suggesting Koontz’s impact will
depend on an aspect of the expansion to monetary conditions); Piedra, supra note 19, at 562
(describing the expansion of Nollan and Dolan to monetary conditions as “unwise”).
21 See, e.g., Ward, supra note 19, at 147 (“[T]he [Koontz] Court makes incorrect and
unsupported assertions about environmental policy . . . .”); id. (pointing out the Court’s
description of “local governments as extortionate over-regulators.”).
22 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 19, at 37 (“[T]he danger in [Koontz] . . . lies in the ad
hoc view that the government somehow owns an environmental easement over all property,
which it will waive only if private individuals engage in acts of environmental mitigation.”).
17
18
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development’s value.23 Second, on remand, the Florida courts read the
statute under which Koontz brought his claim to allow for monetary
damages,24 despite the plain language of the statute and the dissent’s
assertion that it could not be read to authorize the damages.25 These two
facts, respectively, suggest that the Court’s fear of evading Nollan and
Dolan was reasonable, and that the Court’s decision to remand the case to
Florida courts was prudent. Thus, this Comment will argue that the
behind-the-scenes reality of the conflict in Koontz justifies the Court’s
decision.
This Comment proceeds on the premise that the facts of particular
cases should inform the way courts shape constitutional law. That
proposition is up for debate, but it is not one this Comment addresses.
Even the most skeptical of readers will find value in knowing more about
the real-world impact of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
I.

HISTORY
26

In 1972, Coy Koontz, Sr., purchased over fifteen acres of
27
undeveloped land near the intersection of two highways outside Orlando.
Koontz’s neighbors developed the surrounding land intensely, which
28
caused his property to be “significantly altered from its original state.”
Before or in the midst of that development, the Florida Department of
Transportation condemned some of Koontz’s property in order to widen
one of the intersecting highways, thus reducing Koontz’s property to 14.9
29
acres.
A 100-foot-wide power line easement divided the remaining
property into two portions: approximately 3.7 acres sat north of the
30
easement, with the balance of the property south of it.
The northern

See infra Part IV.
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz V), No. 5D06-1116, 2014
WL 1703942, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting a
“$376,000 award of compensation to Koontz for the District’s ‘temporary taking’”).
25 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.
26 Coy Koontz, Sr., passed away while this case was being litigated. His son, Coy
Koontz, Jr., represented his estate for the remainder of the litigation. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at
2591 & n.1 (majority opinion). Like the Court, id., this Comment will not distinguish
between the two men.
27 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz II), 861 So. 2d 1267, 1269
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.; see also id. at 1272 (portraying a diagram of the property).
23
24
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section “drain[ed] well; the most significant standing water form[ed] in ruts
31
in an unpaved road used to access the power lines.”
Over the following years, two Florida statutes impacted the property.
In the same year that Koontz bought it, Florida passed the Water Resources
Act, “which divided the State into five water management districts and
authorized each district to regulate ‘construction that connects to, draws
water from, drains water into, or is placed in or across the waters in the
32
state.’” The Act required landowners interested in developments that fell
within the districts’ jurisdiction to obtain a Management and Storage of
Surface Water (MSSW) permit, and granted the districts wide discretion to
33
issue or deny those permits.
Twelve years later, Florida enacted the
Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, which required a
landowner to obtain a Wetlands Resource Management (WRM) permit to
34
“dredge or fill in, on, or over surface waters.” Pursuant to the Act, the St.
Johns River Water Management District adopted a policy of “requir[ing]
that permit applicants wishing to build on wetlands offset the resulting
environmental damage by creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands
35
elsewhere.”
In 1994, Koontz decided to develop the northern section of the
36
37
property. To do this, he needed to dredge 3.25 acres of wetlands, so he
38
applied to the District for MSSW and WRM permits.
He offered the
District a conservation easement on the southern section of the property to
39
offset his proposal’s environmental effects. A District staffer agreed to
recommend that the District approve the permit if Koontz (a) deeded the
offered conservation easement and paid to either replace culverts four and a
half miles away from the property or plug a number of drainage canals on
property seven miles away, or (b) reduced his development to one acre and
40
deed a conservation easement on the remaining fourteen acres.
The
District also indicated it would consider alternatives to the suggested offsite
41
mitigation.
In the course of reviewing Koontz’s permit application,

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.403(5) (2014)).
Id. (“[T]he relevant district . . . may impose ‘such reasonable conditions’ on the
permit as are ‘necessary to assure’ that construction will ‘not be harmful to the water
resources of the district.’” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.413(1))).
34 Id. (quoting 1984 Fla. Laws 204–05).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Koontz II, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring).
38 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
39 Id. at 2592–93.
40 Koontz II, 861 So. 2d at 1269.
41 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
31
32
33
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Elizabeth Johnson, the District’s “supervising regulatory scientist,” visited
42
the site.
During her visit, Ms. Johnson observed not a single fish or
43
animal. She later acknowledged that the site contained no fish and that
44
she did not perform a wildlife survey of the property. Nonetheless, Ms.
Johnson concluded that Koontz’s development would “adversely affect fish
45
and wildlife.” As such, the District made its demands, Koontz refused
46
them, the District denied Koontz his permit, and a lawsuit commenced.
Koontz filed an action in state court, claiming, inter alia, monetary
relief under a Florida statute that provides damages for parties subjected to
“an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking
47
without just compensation.” The trial court applied Nollan and Dolan to
the offsite-mitigation condition and found that the condition violated both
48
standards.
An intermediate appellate court affirmed, but the Florida
Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing the case from Nollan and Dolan in
that (a) the District denied Koontz’s application for a permit because he
failed to meet its demands, while the government actors in Nollan and
Dolan issued permits with unconstitutional conditions attached, and (b) the
District demanded money, while Nollan and Dolan involved interests in
49
real property. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
50
reversed the Florida Supreme Court.
II.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Writing for the Court, Justice Alito framed the protection at issue as
an application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and then
51
described Nollan’s and Dolan’s history, purposes, and effects. The Court
held that those cases apply to permit denials as well as to permit
52
approvals. Justice Alito explained that “[t]he principles that undergird . . .
Nollan and Dolan do not change depending on whether the government
approves a permit on the condition that the applicant turn over property or
53
denies a permit because the applicant refuses to do so.” The Court found

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Koontz II, 861 So. 2d at 1270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014)).
Id.
Id. at 2593–94.
Id. at 2586.
Id. at 2594–95.
Id. at 2603.
Id. at 2595.
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support for this proposition in cases that condemned conditions to denials
54
of other, unrelated public benefits. The majority also expressed concern
that exempting permit denials from Nollan and Dolan “would enable the
government to evade the limitations of [those cases] simply by phrasing its
55
demands for property as conditions precedent to permit approval.”
The majority then explained that Koontz suffered a cognizable injury
despite the fact that no taking actually occurred. The Florida Supreme
Court had held that the government’s demand could not have violated the
56
Takings Clause because “no property of any kind was ever taken.” The
Court clarified that the Taking Clause protects private actors from the
actual taking of property and, through the unconstitutional conditions
57
doctrine, from “the impermissible denial of a government benefit.” The
only pertinent difference between conditions that accompany approvals and
those that accompany denials is that the Fifth Amendment prescribes a
58
remedy for the imposition of the former conditions: just compensation.
Absent a “consummated taking,” only a separately established cause of
59
action can lead to damages. A state law created Koontz’s cause of action,
so the Court passed on what remedies Nollan and Dolan might justify
60
absent such a cause of action. The majority left it to the Florida courts to
decide whether the state statute that created Koontz’s cause of action—
which provided monetary damages for “unreasonable exercise[s] of the
state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation”61—
62
applied to unconstitutional conditions claims.
The Court then held that Nollan and Dolan apply to monetary
exactions, including the District’s demand for money to pay for offsite
63
mitigation. As an initial matter, the majority observed that “it would be
very easy for land-use permitting officials to evade” Nollan and Dolan if

54 Id. (citing Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
55 Id.
56 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2011).
57 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596. “Extortionate demands for property in the land-use
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property but
because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just
compensation.” Id.
58 Id. at 2597.
59 Id.; see also id. (“[W]hether money damages are available is not a question of
federal constitutional law but of the cause of action . . . on which the landowner relies.”
(emphasis added)).
60 Id.
61 FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014).
62 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
63 Id. at 2603.
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demands to spend money were not subjected to their limitations.
In
expanding Nollan and Dolan, Justice Alito distinguished this case from an
unfavorable precedent. A four-Justice plurality previously held in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel that the United States government’s retroactive
imposition on a former mining company of an obligation to pay for retired
employees’ medical benefits “was so arbitrary that it violated the Takings
65
Clause.” But in the same case, five Justices—one of whom concurred in
the result and four of whom dissented—concluded that “the Takings Clause
does not apply to government-imposed financial obligations that ‘d[o] not
66
operate upon or alter an identified property interest.’”
In Koontz, the
District argued that because five Justices concluded in Apfel that the
Takings Clause could not apply to a monetary burden, the District’s
demand for money to pay for offsite mitigation could not be a violation of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The Court acknowledged that “[a]
predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government
could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do
67
what it attempted to pressure that person into doing,” but distinguished
this case in that, unlike Apfel, “the monetary obligation burdened
68
petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land.” The Court compared
the District’s hypothetical exaction of Koontz’s money to the taking of a
69
lien or of the “right to receive income from land.” The majority asserted
that “[t]he fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link between the
70
government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property.”
The Court also addressed several of the dissent’s concerns. First,
Justice Alito turned to the District’s and the dissent’s arguments that the
extension of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions allows for “no
principled way of distinguishing impermissible land-use exactions from
71
property taxes.” The Court offered a twofold defense: first, the problem
of distinguishing taxes from takings is not unique to the context of land
72
use; and second, distinguishing taxes from takings is easier in practice
73
than it is in theory. To support these points, the Court cited two types of
monetary seizures previously invalidated as takings: interest on funds held

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 2599.
Id. (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529–37 (1998) (plurality opinion)).
Id. (quoting Apfel, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Id. at 2598.
Id. at 2599.
Id. at 2600.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2600–01.
Id. at 2601.
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75

in escrow and liens.
The Court also suggested state law will often
76
answer the question of what is or is not a tax. For example, Florida’s
statutes “greatly circumscribe[]” how various government entities can go
77
about taxation.
The Court declined to offer guidance regarding the point at which
land-use permitting charges rise to the level of taxation, though the opinion
alluded to a deciding factor being the fee’s arbitrariness.78 The Court was
careful to preserve governments’ abilities “to impose property taxes, user
fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on
79
property owners.”
III.

THE DISSENT

Writing for four Justices, Justice Kagan dissented, departing from the
80
Court’s extension of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions. Justice
Kagan voiced two fundamental objections to the expansion of Nollan and
Dolan: it violated a valid Court precedent81 and would unduly restrict local
governments.82 The dissent agreed with the Court that Nollan and Dolan
83
apply to permit denials as well as conditional approvals, but asserted that
even on the majority’s terms, the case should have been dismissed instead
of remanded.84
The dissent asserted that the Court’s extension of Nollan and Dolan to
monetary exactions violated Apfel, arguing that the Justices’ consensus—
that the Takings Clause did not apply to monetary exactions—controlled
85
the issue.
Justice Kagan suggested the Court should have resolved
Koontz’s claim under the regulatory takings doctrine governed by Penn
86
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. The Penn Central doctrine

74 Id. (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003)).
75 Id. (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 2602 (declining to comment on the point at which “a land-use permitting
charge denominated by the government as a ‘tax’ becomes ‘so arbitrary . . . that it [is] not
the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property’” (quoting Brushaber v. Union Pac.
R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916))).
79 Id. at 2601.
80 Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 2603–04.
82 Id. at 2604.
83 Id. at 2603.
84 Id. at 2609.
85 Id. at 2603–04.
86 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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generally prohibits governments from “unduly restricting the use of
87
property.”
Justice Kagan’s second major objection was to the decision’s practical
effects. She predicted that, absent any meaningful constraints, the
majority’s view would lead to unnecessary judicial commandeering of local
88
law.
She also criticized the Court’s refusal to explain how one might
89
distinguish taxes from exactions.
The dissent concluded that “the
majority’s analysis seems to grow out of a yen for a prophylactic rule” that
would prevent governments from evading Nollan and Dolan, but that there
90
was no real problem to be prevented. Justice Kagan also commented on
the dearth of empirical evidence that local governments routinely evade
91
Nollan and Dolan when given the chance.
The issue of monetary exactions aside, Justice Kagan would have
dismissed the case on two separate grounds: first, that the District’s
92
negotiations with Koontz never rose to the level of “demands,” and
second, that since no taking occurred, the Takings Clause provided Koontz
93
with no remedy. As to her first argument, Justice Kagan asserted that
“Nollan and Dolan apply only when the government makes a ‘demand[]’
94
that a landowner turn over property in exchange for a permit.” She found
support for that requirement—that there be a demand over and above a
mere condition—in the majority’s view that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine “rests on the fear that the government may use its control over
benefits (like permits) to ‘coerc[e]’ a person into giving up a constitutional
95
right.”
Justice Kagan predicted that unless Nollan and Dolan were
limited to “unequivocal” demands, mere negotiations between localities
and developers would come under judicial scrutiny and thus, “no local
government official with a decent lawyer would have a conversation with a
96
developer.” Citing Koontz’s “refus[al]” to return to the negotiating table
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2607 (noting that the majority’s decisions might lead to “[t]he Federal
Constitution . . . decid[ing] whether one town is overcharging for sewage, or another is
setting the price to sell liquor too high”).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2608.
91 Id. (“No one has presented evidence that in the many States declining to apply
heightened scrutiny to permitting fees, local officials routinely short-circuit Nollan and
Dolan to extort the surrender of real property interests having no relation to a development’s
costs.”).
92 Id. at 2609 (“[T]he District never demanded that Koontz give up anything . . . as a
condition for granting him a permit.” (emphasis added)).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 2609–10 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2004)).
95 Id. at 2610 (quoting id. at 2594 (majority opinion)).
96 Id.
87
88
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with the District, Justice Kagan concluded that “the District never made a
97
demand or set a condition.”
Justice Kagan’s final ground for dissent was that because there was no
real taking, Koontz’s only available method of relief was invalidation of
98
the condition. Koontz’s hope for monetary relief depended on judicial
construction of the Florida statute that established his cause of action; for
him to recover, the Court would have to read the statute to allow for relief
99
“beyond just compensation.” Where the majority remanded the question
100
of relief under the Florida statute to the Florida Supreme Court, Justice
Kagan observed that the statute’s plain language “authorize[d] damages
only for ‘an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a
taking without just compensation,’” and she concluded that since no taking
101
occurred, Koontz could not possibly recover.
IV.

ANALYSIS: WHY THE FACTS JUSTIFY THE COURT

A behind-the-scenes analysis of Koontz reveals two important
observations. First, the District’s actions were less justified than either the
Court or the dissent recognized, suggesting that the majority’s fear of
localities evading Nollan and Dolan was reasonable. Second, on remand,
the Florida courts did in fact read the statute under which Koontz brought
his claim to allow for monetary damages, justifying the Court’s decision to
remand the case.
A thorough reading of the lower courts’ opinions reveals that the
District’s actions were cause for serious concern. Concurring with an
intermediate appellate court’s decision to dismiss the District’s appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, Judge Robert Pleus wrote a short description of the
District’s actions in “hope that upon remand to the District, it [would] . . .
stop the extortionate demands on property owners which this case
102
demonstrate[d].”
Judge Pleus also described the expert testimony
regarding the environmental value of the property Koontz wanted to
develop—a crucial aspect of the case, given that the District’s permitgranting power came from environmental legislation. A 2001
“environmental audit” of the property indicated that its environmental

Id. at 2611.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2603 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2014)).
Koontz II, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J.,
concurring).
97
98
99
100
101
102
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103

value was already diminished and that the environmental impact of the
104
proposed development would be “minimal.”
Two other experts’
105
testimonies supported that finding, one noting that the suggested “offsite
106
mitigation was unnecessary and ‘very excessive.’”
At trial, the District
offered the testimony of Elizabeth Johnson, its in-house “supervising
regulatory scientist” who, despite observing not a single fish or animal on
the site, “concluded that the proposed development would adversely affect
107
fish and wildlife.”
The rest of the Florida courts’ opinions and orders
contain a shocking dearth of evidence that Koontz’s development would
108
have a cognizable environmental impact.
Judge Pleus’s description sheds light on the Supreme Court’s decision,
not because of the ridiculousness of the District’s assertion that Koontz’s
109
development would have a real environmental impact, but because it
highlights that the District’s actions demonstrated incompetence, if not
malice. It is shocking that in twenty years—from the litigation’s
110
commencement in 1994 through its final disposition in 2014 —the
District was unable to prove that the development would have any
cognizable environmental impact. The Supreme Court’s discussion of this
111
aspect of the case is short and mild, but the concern that refusing to
expand Nollan and Dolan to monetary conditions “would enable the
government to evade” those standards “simply by phrasing its demands for
112
property as conditions precedent to permit approval” might be quite

103 See id. at 1269 (explaining that an expert witness testified that the property “had
been impacted by surrounding roads, a drainage ditch, a power line easement and
urbanization”).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1269–70.
106 Id. at 1270.
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz IV), 5 So. 3d 8, 9–
10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the entirety of the case’s factual and procedural
history, with no mention of any environmental impact the development may have
threatened); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI 94-5673, 2002 WL
34724740, at 873–74 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002) (noting that the District failed to satisfy
Nollan and Dolan, with no mention of environmental impact); Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI 94-5673, 1997 WL 34854535, at 514 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29,
1997) (dismissing Koontz’s original complaint, with no mention of environmental impact).
109 By itself, that information would only inform a Dolan rough proportionality
inquiry, and the question before the Court was whether Dolan should apply at all.
110 See Koontz V, No. 5D06-1116, 2014 WL 1703942, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr.
30, 2014) (affirming the trial court’s disposition).
111 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–93
(2013).
112 Id. at 2595.
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strong in the face of a state agency that evidently felt no need to justify
113
exacting up to $150,000 from a private citizen.
Perhaps this history
indicates nothing but incompetence or a bureaucratic oversight. But if the
District’s actions were malicious or manipulative—or indicated a larger
movement towards the unjustified exaction of private money in the
permitting process to serve policy goals—they may provide a novel
defense of the majority’s opinion.
Second, the Florida courts’ resolution of the case on remand indicates
that the majority was right not to dismiss the case. Justice Kagan colorfully
asserted that the State of Florida is not the “inside-out, upside-down
universe” in which “a law authorizing damages only for a ‘taking’ also
114
provide[s] damages when (as all agree) no taking has occurred.”
Alas,
there remains an argument that the State of Florida is precisely that
universe. On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Florida
Supreme Court in turn remanded the case to the intermediate appellate
115
116
court.
The appellate court affirmed $376,000 in damages to Koontz
for the taking that all nine Supreme Court Justices agree never occurred.
Dissenting from the appellate court’s affirmation, Judge Griffin observed
that in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s decision,
“[b]ecause there was no ‘taking’ . . . the question remain[ed] whether
117
Koontz ha[d] a damages remedy under” the Florida statute.
However,
neither the appellate court nor the Florida Supreme Court expressly
118
reviewed that question, and after the smoke cleared, the $376,000 award
119
still stood.
Surely the award indicates that Justice Alito was right to remand the
case. If the Florida appellate court interpreted the statute sub silentio to
allow for monetary damages in situations like Koontz’s, dismissing the
case would have gravely intruded on a state’s right to interpret its own
laws. Whether the Florida appellate court was right to interpret (or not
interpret) the statute as it did is beyond the scope of this Comment—the
113 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, slip op. at 868
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 2002), available at 2002 WL 34724740 (noting that the offsite
mitigation “could cost between $90,000.00 and $150,000.00,” but also acknowledging
“there is evidence it could cost as little as $10,000.00”).
114 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
115 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 129 So. 3d 1069, 1069 (Fla. 2013).
116 Koontz V, No. 5D06-1116, 2014 WL 1703942, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30,
2014) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting the still-valid “$376,000 award of compensation to
Koontz for the District’s ‘temporary taking’”).
117 Id. at *4.
118 See id. at *2 (majority opinion) (summarily adopting and reaffirming Koontz IV in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision); see also Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) (acknowledging the award of damages for the alleged taking).
119 Koontz V, 2014 WL 1703942, at *2 (affirming the trial court’s disposition).
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point is that Justice Alito’s decision to remand demonstrated restraint,
wisdom, and laudable sensitivity to federalism concerns. Far from an
empty formality, the decision had a six-digit impact on the litigants.
CONCLUSION
The behind-the-scenes reality of Koontz—in particular, the
extortionate actions of St. Johns River Water Management District and the
Florida courts’ decision to award monetary damages—indicates that the
Court was right to dispose of the case as it did. In particular, the District’s
behavior may have justified the majority’s concern that localities would
evade the constitutional requirements of Nollan and Dolan, and the award
of damages, notwithstanding the Florida statute’s clear language, shows
that the majority was right to remand the case. The effects of expanding
Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions remain to be seen, but the Court’s
resolution of the facts before it was certainly justified, if not admirable.

